Non-proliferation and Safeguards by Design considerations in the WATSS recycling process

Abstract

The recycling of spent nuclear fuel followed by the transmutation of actinides in a waste-burner reactor brings several advantages over the open cycle, in terms of both legacy waste management and fuel availability for the new reactors. It may also bring long-term proliferation resistance and more manageable application of safeguards over time. This is at the heart of the Moltex project at the Point Lepreau site, with its WAste To Stable Salt (WATSS) recycling facility and Stable Salt Reactor – Wasteburner (SSR-W).

Although the recycling of spent nuclear fuel has been hampered in North America by proliferation concerns, the WATSS process presents some inherent proliferation resistance characteristics such as its unsuitability to separate plutonium from minor actinides and lanthanides. The end product of the combined facility is depleted in plutonium, which removes concerns about the potential attractiveness of wastes. Also, the small footprint of the facility, with the process in hot cells with well-defined physical barriers, is suitable for the application of containment and surveillance provisions.

Different features of proliferation-resistance and safeguards application will be integrated in the design process of a WATSS facility in application of a “safeguards by design” concept that leverages inherent characteristics of the recycling process. Early considerations of these aspects will help improve the level of assurance that this kind of facility would not be suitable for proliferation purposes and contribute to the effectiveness of multinational verification activities.